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ABSTRACT Named Data Network (NDN) is a network paradigm that attempts to answer today’s needs
for distribution. One of the NDN key features is in-network caching to increase content distribution and
network efficiency. However, this feature may increase the privacy concerns, as the adversary may identify
the call history, and the callee/caller location through side-channel timing responses from the cache of
trusted Voice over NDN (VoNDN) application routers. The side-channel timing attack can be mitigated by
countermeasures, such as additional unpredictable delay, random caching, group signatures, and no-caching
configurations. However, the content distributionmay be affected by pre-configured countermeasures, which
may be against the original purpose of NDN. In this work, the detection and defense (DaD) approach is
proposed to mitigate the attack efficiently and effectively. With the DaD usage, an attack can be detected
by a multi-level detection mechanism, in order to apply the countermeasures against the adversarial faces.
Also, the detections can be used to determine the severity of the attack. In order to detect the behavior of an
adversary, a brute-force timing attack was implemented and simulated of the VoNDN application on NDN-
testbed. A trusted application that mimics the VoNDN and identifies the cached certificate on a worldwide
NDN-testbed. In simulation primary results showed that the multi-level detection based on DaD mitigated
the attack about 39.1% in best-route, and 36.5% in multicast communications. Additionally, the results
showed that DaD preserves privacy without compromising the efficiency benefits of in-network caching
in the VoNDN application.
INDEX TERMS NDN, VoNDN, certificate privacy, a side-channel timing attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, the Internet is forced to handle content distri-
bution for social media and online content services. How-
ever, the IP network is not suitable for such use, because
of its point-to-point design. To overcome this problem,
Information-Centric Networks (ICNs) have been proposed,
such as the Named Data Network (NDN) [1], [2]. In NDN,
the contents are named and each content is cached by the net-
work nodes to improve the content distribution performance.
Nevertheless, caching, despite its benefits, may threaten the
privacy of NDN consumers and producers [3]. For instance,
content previously cached may reveal its name, content, and
signature through a side-channel timing attack [4]. To miti-
gate the timing attack, diverse countermeasure methods have
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
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been proposed by other works, such as artificial content
delay [5], [6], random caching [4], and encrypted names
[7]. Although these methods are effective to mitigate the
side-channel attacks, they may affect the performance of the
content distribution.
This work attempts to answer the following question: Is
it possible to maintain the content distribution while using
countermeasures to mitigate the side-channel timing attack?
In this work, a trusted Voice over NDN (VoNDN) application
was developed to point out the privacy of the certificate.
In order to achieve realistic results, the trusted VoNDN appli-
cation was run on a simulator that emulates the NDN-testbed
[8]. An alternative countermeasure approach is proposed
(detection and defense (DaD)) to maximize content distri-
bution. The DaD is based on detecting the attack first then
apply multi-level countermeasure methods on the attacked
router. The scenario results showed that the DaD can be stated
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as an efficient method to mitigate the attack and preserving
the legitimate nodes compared to other static countermeasure
configurations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
summarizes the previous related work for the side-channel
timing attack inNDN. Section III summarizes theNDNarchi-
tecture and its data-centric features. Section IV describes the
voice-over NDN architecture with its trusted scheme for the
consumers. Section V presents the current countermeasure
methods. Section VI introduces the Detection and Defense
privacy approach to efficiently mitigate the side-channel tim-
ing attack on the VoNDN certificate scheme. Section VII
presents the attack scenario implementation and discusses the
results. Finally, Section IX draws the conclusions.
II. RELATED WORKS
The related works include attacks and countermeasures.
A. ATTACK RELATED WORKS
The works [1], [9]–[11], [3], [7], [12], [13], and [4] presented
and discussed possible side-channel timing attack design that
may affect the content, signature (certificate), and name pri-
vacy in ICN and NDN networks. This design (traditional) is
based on particular targets to succeed in the attack. However,
such a design may reduce attack performance and efficiency
considering multiple targets.
The work [13] presented an attack-type that is for Geo-
locating the consumers in the NDN-testbed. The consumer
may have the information about hop count which used to
obtain the hops between the routers. The adversary may use
this information to obtain consumers’ cached contents by
NDN-testbed hops. This attack is similar to a side-channel
timing attack because the cached contents hop counts can be
slightly noticeable for non-cached contents. To mitigate the
attack, it was prosed that the hop count information may be
turned-off for the users.
B. COUNTERMEASURE RELATED WORKS
The work [4] widely studied the cache privacy and the adver-
sary threats to the consumer and producer privacy on theNDN
paradigm. Also, countermeasure methods were proposed to
mitigate the attack based on the other work [5] -k anonymity
based delay algorithms (no cache, delay, and random cache).
These countermeasure methods applied to privacy-sensitive
contents can be indicated by its producer and consumer.
The delay may be used to mitigate the side-channel attack
on privacy-sensitive indicated contents. However, an addi-
tional delay may imply a trade-off between privacy and
latency because it also applied to legitimate requests. For
instance, a higher τ value can disable the cache on routers as
discussed by [4] and [6]. Also, user-driven countermeasures
may not be usable in the real world. For instance, what is
private for a user may not be private by other users.
The work [10] presented an extensive study for timing
attacks on ICN privacy. The side-channel timing attack and
its findings were presented with possible countermeasures
methods to mitigate the attack in ICN networks. The trade-
offs of countermeasures were evaluated by primary results,
especially on additional delay approach algorithms. Also,
they proposed a user-driven countermeasure method called
‘‘Vanilla’’. For privacy-sensitive contents, an edge router
caches the content from the producer and keeps the retrieval
times of the first interest and delay the next coming requests.
However, the per-client solution will not be feasible, because
of a large number of consumers and content distribution
efficiency.
The NDN promisingmaximum in-network caching feature
to achieve lower latency for requested contents. However,
the work [14] stated that the cache may not be necessary
to be configured for maximum size. For instance, the cache
can have the same performance on different distributions.
Through not caching each content, privacy can be preserved
for a timing attack. This method can reduce the attack perfor-
mance but considering at least one segment must be cached
by a router, this can be still targeted by an adversary.
The work [7] presented an anonymity tool called ANDaNA
that is build top of NDN. The tool provides maximized
consumer anonymity through unreadable (encrypted) name-
spaces. However, when the name-spaces became unreadable
except whoever asks for it, the usage of CS becomes useless
because no consumer can retrieve contents from CS. Simi-
larly like ANDaNA, the work [15] also presented a system
tool called PrivICN that relies on encryption schemes on con-
tents. The other work Kondo et al. [16] and Chaabane et al.
[6] proposed a name filtering against information privacy
leakages in NDN. Also, the bloom filters may introduce false
positives and periodically require resetting and reducing the
performance of the cache. Effectively, the un-readable name
and filtering techniques may prove ‘‘perfect privacy’’ but also
comes with the disabled cache. Since NDN promising the
contents must be cached to achieve low latency, the name
filtering and encryption approaches may not be the most
feasible for the NDN paradigm.
The group signatures can be used to preserve the signature
(certificate) privacy as proposed by Chaum and Van Heyst
[17] and Boneh et al. [18]. A group signature can be done by
anymember of a group. The signature is verifiable by anyone,
but it is not possible to know which group member actually
done it. Consequently, the privacy of the certificate or content
can be maintained in the trusted group. However, considering
collaborating with the group members, such a group trust
scheme relies on limited configurations for verification and
identification.
III. NAMED DATA NETWORKING
The NDN architecture aims to develop a new Internet archi-
tecture that can capitalize on the strengths and address weak-
nesses of point-to-point architecture to naturally accommo-
date emerging patterns of communication needs.
The works of [1], [19], and [2] have proposed the NDN
project, a network paradigm that is an evolution of the IP
architecture. In NDN, any packet object can be named instead
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of naming the endpoints. This is a feature that changes the
network semantics from packet delivery to the identified
destination address to caching data by a given name.
NDN is based on two main packet types: interest packets
and data1 packets. Interest packets are issued by the con-
sumers and data packets by the producers. The content name
in the interest packet identifies the request of the consumer,
for example, /pt/uminho/algoritmi is a name for a content,
expressed in a structured way. It can be used to name contents
related to the Algoritmi research center. As shown in Figure 1,
the producer includes a signature in the data packet. Mecha-
nisms for signing and verifying the integrity of the contents
have been proposed for NDN, such as the one described in
[1], [19].
FIGURE 1. Packet types in NDN (adapted from [2]).
A. IN-NETWORK STORAGE
NDN supports that any data packet can independently be
retrieved from the network. Thus, the NDN router can cache
data packets in CS (Content Store), to satisfy future incoming
interests for contents. The CS is similar to today’s buffer
memories in IP routers. However, each NDN router can reuse
a data packet while the IP routers cannot. Note that NDN
handles the repositories (e.g. CS) and network channels as
data retrieval sources.
On the other hand, the CS is a benefit for network con-
gestion. In the presence of congestion, if it occurs for any
reason, CS retransmits the data. Imagine two congested links
along a path between a consumer and a producer. If the
requested data packet gets through the first congested link
somehow, but couldn’t get through the second one, then the
data packet is dropped. But it remains in the CS of the
intermediary node. Then, the consumer’s interest becomes
timed-out and the interest packet is resent. Caching will allow
the data packet to be retransmitted to the consumer over
only the second congested link. However, on the traditional
Internet, the retransmission of the data packet can only be
done by the content producer, and the data packet has to pass
through the first congested link again.
So, CS presents optimal data delivery for static con-
tent, while getting supported by today’s in-network reposi-
tories without having an application layer overlay. Even the
dynamic contents, such as broadcasting or real-time confer-
encing, can benefit from CS in case of a packet loss.
1In this work, the terms ‘‘data’’ and ‘‘content’’ are used interchangeably.
B. ROUTING AND FORWARDING
In an NDN router, the forwarding of interest packets and data
packets are carried out by three engines: Pending Interest
Table (PIT), Forwarding Information Base (FIB), and Con-
tent Store (CS).
CS represents a cache for data packets, similar to Internet
routers buffer memory. FIB is a name prefixes routing table
and respective outgoing interfaces, used to route interests.
PIT is a pending interest table and a set of corresponding
incoming interfaces.
FIGURE 2. NDN forwarding engine model (adapted from [1]).
As Figure 2 illustrates, when a consumer interest is
received, a lookup is made on the CS for previously cached
content that matches the name requested. If there is a match-
ing content, it is sent as a reply with a data packet. If the data
packet is not in the CS, the router checks the data name in
the PIT. If there is a matching name in the PIT, the router
records the incoming face of the interest for the future reply
and stops the procedure. If not, a new PIT entry is created for
that name, recording the incoming interface, and a lookup is
done on FIB. The interest is routed using FIB information to
the producer. For each forwarding interest packet, the longest
name prefix match is a lookup in the FIB, which determines
where to send it. The list of outgoing faces of the FIBmatched
entry is an important reference for the routing. In case a
name is not found in FIB, the interest becomes unsatisfied.
When all FIB lookup misses are replied with a NACK packet,
the forwarder can limit the requests [1], [19]. For example,
this can be used to mitigate the denial of service attack in
NDN, as described in [20].
C. SECURITY AND PRIVACY
In NDN, security is a built-in data function, rather than being
a function of how and where data is obtained. The producer
signs the data packet binding its name to data. In NDN, it is
mandatory to use the signatures. So, each data packet and
corresponding application must meet security requirements.
NDN supports a fine-grained trust scheme. This allows
determining whether a public key owner is an acceptable
content publisher, for a specific piece of the data, into a
particular context.
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FIGURE 3. NDN certificate format (adapted from [21]).
Figure 3 illustrates the NDN certificate. In NDN, a certifi-
cate can be presented as like any other content that is carry-
ing a public key. The ‘‘key’’ refers to a content packet that
carries a public key. The KeyLocator refers to the certificate
issuer or certificate authority.
A data packet seals the binding between name and data
through a digital signature. The advantage of using the cer-
tificate as a data packet is that a consumer can retrieve and
validate a certificate by issuing an interest packet. Indeed,
the public key certificate has the general format of a data
packet. For instance, a producer expresses a certificate chal-
lenge using name and content to carry the public key bits.
Content-centric security and trust ensure the integrity of the
content. However, the in-network storage feature increases
privacy concerns. Also, the digitally signed packets do not
guarantee to protect content or cache privacy in NDN. For
instance, the recently cached content characteristics may be
different than un-cached ones, the adversary uses this infor-
mation to determine the cached contents from CS. The infor-
mation may be present publicly the public key certificate,
the name, the content, and the cache size.
All NDN contents are digitally signed by its producer,
to provide integrity and guarantee on provenance which
makes all signatures publicly verifiable by the NDN nodes
and application layers.2
However, digitally signed contents are may leak sensitive
information about the content signer. Because contents carry
a public key that is publicly fetchable by any consumer,
the adversary may be able to determine content producer by
using a timing attack.
For instance, the two-way conversation tool VoCCN [22]
is based on signed contents, to keep content integrity between
the callee and caller.3 In this structure, the certificates may be
used to verify the content producer. Since the certificates are
effectively a content and cached in NDN node by the appli-
cation layer, the adversary may use the timing differences,
to identify the call history, location, and users by a timing
attack.
2Currently the NDN offers RSA (Rivest–Shamir–Adleman) and ECDSA
(Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm) signature algorithms.
3The callee and caller is an effective content producer and consumer.
IV. VOICE OVER NDN
Voice over IP (VoIP) is a transmission method of
voice/video communication over IP. VoIP requires inter-
mediary exchange protocols, such as Real-Time Transport
Protocol (RTP) or Secure RTP (SRTP), and a signaling
protocol, e.g. Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) to establish
a call, as described in [23].
In CCNnetworks, the data flows directly from the producer
to the consumer. Therefore, the media and signaling paths can
be defined between the producer and the consumer. Based
on this idea, the VoCCN design has been proposed by [22].
In VoCCN, the signaling and media paths can be combined
and the voice packets can directly flow between callee and
caller without requiring any translation middleware because
packets can flow directly between callee and caller.
Architecture of Voice Over NDN (VoNDN): Similarly to
VoCCN, this work introduces voice-over NDN (VoNDN) as
a use case for testing purposes.
As Figure 4 illustrates, the NDN name can be used to
establish signaling and media paths for voice/video calls.
The SIP may be used to create a signal path from Alice to
Bob. A SIP invitation message carries a randomly generated
symmetric key k. The caller (Alice) can encrypt the key block
(k) using callee’s (Bob) public key (B_pub). When creating
a signaling interest packet the caller would include both the
encrypted block (B_pub((k))) and the authenticated SIP mes-
sage ((k)(SIP_INVITE)). The callee, on receiving the interest,
could decrypt the key block with its private key, recover
(k), and use it to verify and decrypt the SIP_INVITE. The
caller would then use key (k) to encrypt its SIP_RESPONSE
message.4
When the signaling path is securely established, the SIP
packets are replaced by RTP media packets. As seen in Fig-
ure 4, the SIP exchange section is replaced by the call identifi-
cation (call-id), together with other required information and
a sequence number (seq-no) used to control different media
fragments.
A. POTENTIAL PRIVACY RISKS IN VoNDN
Theoretically, the secured VoNDN conversation may face
side-channel timing attacks. The aforementioned attributes
of encrypted traffic (trusted conversation) of the side-channel
information may be used to leak insights from the communi-
cation users. Since the callee and caller are presented as pro-
ducer and consumer, the cached contents may be used to iden-
tify the callee or the caller (conversation pairs), the location,
and the time of the established conversation. For instance,
Zhang et al. [24] show how to reveal the voice call history
of the user by side-channel timing attack in IP. The attack
method also can reveal the call history of a group call in VoIP.
The timing attack is aimed against the victim’s SIP proxy
server. The other work Lauinger [9] and Lauinger et al. [12]
studied the side-channels on Voice-over CCNs. It is shown
4In VoNDN, the callee and the caller play the role of producer and
consumer at the same time.
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FIGURE 4. VoNDN combined paths (adapted from [22]).
that an adversary can replicate the VoCCN packets in order
to learn the size of the cached voice packets. Because of the
voice is encoded using by variable-bit-rate encoding scheme,
each of voice packets can be shaped by its phrases. This may
lead to learning the previously spoken voice packets even the
conversation is encrypted between VoIP pairs as described by
[25], [26].
In VoNDN, the voice packet public-key integrity is estab-
lished by the certificate and may be managed by a SIP
authentication domain, such as an inter-domain authentica-
tion protocol (e.g. IP authentication protocol RFC4474 [27]).
To expedite the next request(s), the certificate is cached for a
certain period by a SIP proxy.
As Figure 5 illustrates, the certificate from the caller’s
domain is cached by callee’s proxy. The adversary takes
advantage of the SIP processing time to obtain a certificate
that has been cached or not. Through the time responses of
certificates, the adversary may obtain the VoNDN call history
of a SIP domain.
In this work, the Content Retrieval Time (CRT) is defined
as the period between sending the interest and retrieving
the respective content, which can be cached or un-cached.
As certificates are treated as contents, the CRT definition can
be also applied for the certificates.
Figure 5a illustrates that the caller has to get the certificate
from the certification authority since it is not cached by
CS. This certificate request process time is calculated by the
equation:
CRTuncached = T1 + T2 + Td + T3 + T4 (1)
where:
T1: the content retrieval time for sending the
SIP_INVITE message.
T2: the processing time for the SIP message.
T3: the signature verification time for Alice’s identity.
FIGURE 5. Side-channel timing attack on VoNDN trust scheme, (a) first
time for certificate lookup, (b) Future request the certificate from CS
(adapted from [24]).
T4: the CRT time response from Alice SIP proxy (e.g.
content store).
Td : the CRT time for the intended lookup certificate.
As illustrated in Figure 5b, if Alice’s certificate has been
cached by the CS, then its request process time is calculated
by the equation:
CRTcached = T1 + T2 + T3 + T4 (2)
In this example, the adversary targeted Alice’s certificate
by distinguishing the cached and un-cached certificate CRT
responses.
Note that, only the caller’s (Alice) side is illustrated
in Figure 5. On the other side, similarly, the callee (Bob)
receives the invitation from the caller that needs to be verified
and fetch with the caller’s (Alice) certificate from the SIP
server. Thus callee can validate the signature of the caller to
establish the call.
B. DETERMINE CLOSE AND AWAY TARGETS
In naive condition, the certificate can be replied by cor-
responding CS to the callee and caller in VoNDN. The
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adversary may use cached certificate CRT value to determine
the consumer location or established call time. Note that,
if the certificated packet only issued for a certain consumer,
the adversary cannot determine the content because of a lack
of the private key. Still, the adversary can knowledge the
existence of the location of the cached content because of
knowing the public key.
On the other hand, the adversary can determine the distance
of a certificate from its cache using the CRT information.
Let us suppose that the side-channel timing attack CRT mea-
surement for a certificate is CRT2 (retrieved content from
CA), CRT1 is the CRT from the edge NDN router, CRTe is
the expected CRT of the intended content lookup, and ε is a
very small time difference. According to Chaabane et al. [6]
and Mohaisen et al. [10], after collecting the CRT samples,
the adversary concludes that:
• if |CRTe − CRT1| < ε, the target certificate has been
cached by the edge router.
• if |CRTe−CRT2| < ε, the target certificate is not cached
by any router, except the certificate authority.
• if CRTe > CRT1 and CRTe < CRT2, the target cer-
tificate has been cached by away routers. Note that,
the adversary can still predict the certificate location
(number of hops) by relying on CRT1 and CRT2 values.
FIGURE 6. Side-channel timing attack on close and away targets: (a)
Determine Bob’s and Alice’s certificate from the edge router location, (b)
Determine Bob’s certificate from away router location.
The CRT side-channel timing attack has been based on two
adversary models: i. one able to identify the certificates at
the edge (closest) router (Figure 6a), and ii. another able to
identify the cached certificate from away (more than one hop)
routers (Figure 6b). When an adversary collects all possible
CRT values, it can do three assumptions about where the
certificate (target) has been cached.
First, the maximum CRT value shows that the certificate is
not cached by any NDN routers expect CA. Second, the min-
imum CRT value indicates the certificate has been recently
cached by the edge router. Third, if the CRT is between a
minimum and a maximum value, the adversary concludes
that the content was cached by an away router. Note that, this
router can be one hop (neighbor) or more than one hop away.
Additionally, more than one adversary can be used to
determine the established call between Bob and Alice by
attacking their certificates (Figure 6a). On the other hand,
a single adversary may still determine Bob’s certificate from
away location (Figure 6b).
According to the cached certificate CRT comparisons,
the scope of the trusted VoNDN attack can be summarized
by following determinations:
• Figure 6a illustrates that the adversaries (Adversary-1,-
2) estimate the time of an established call between Alice
and Bob from their edge routers by looking up their
certificates (a_cert and b_cert).
• Figure 6b illustrates that the adversary (Adversary-1)
identifies that who had a conversation with Bob recently
by looking up to Alice’s certificate (a_cert) from edge
router. Also, the approximated the location of Alice
by looking up to Bob’s certificate (b_cert) from away
location.
• Figure 6a and 6b are illustrated that the adversaries
(Adversary-1,-2) identify where the call was established
between Bob and Alice by comparing CRT responses of
the certificates (a_cert and b_cert).
V. COUNTERMEASURES
In VoNDN, the side-channel timing attack can be mitigated
by statically (always-on) pre-configured countermeasures on
the caching routers. These can be based on the manipu-
late of the CRT values of the NDN router. Through this,
the adversary may not able to obtain the shortest CRT values
which also used to obtain the cached certificates. In this
work, the countermeasure methods were classified by i. cache
available and ii. cache disabled approaches.
Figure 7 illustrates the main concept of the countermeasure
approaches. In this scenario, Alice requested content from the
producer and it replied the content segments, were cached by
the router and CRT calculated as 1+t. If Alice re-request a
segment, the cache replies to this request instead of sending it
till the producer and CRT calculated as1. In the side-channel
timing attack, the adversary pursues the CRT of 1 to obtain
the target that has been cached recently.
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FIGURE 7. Statically configured countermeasure configurations.
Since the 1 can be used to illustrate for all cached con-
tents and the adversary pursues it, the countermeasure meth-
ods can be based on increasing the CRT value of 1 with
some additional value from the configuration, as discussed
next. Based on the countermeasure configurations, the attack
can be mitigated on adversary face (face1). However, these
countermeasures based on the static configuration which
also affects the legitimate node requests (face0). Therefore,
the pre-configured countermeasures are not able to distin-
guish between adversary and legitimate nodes.
A. CACHE AVAILABLE METHODS
The cache available countermeasure methods are used to
increase the value of1 to all faces (face0 and face1) and these
can be classified into three groups: i. delay content, ii. random
caching, and iii. group signatures.
1) DELAY CONTENT
Data delivery in the NDN is affected by a certain delay
imposed by the routers. This delay can be a solution to prevent
cached content attacks. Let us consider 1 the default delay
value which presents the CRT of cached targets. In a side-
channel timing attack, the adversary tries to figure out the 1
value. The adversarial CRT calculation can be challenged if a
delay of τ was chosen based on random function by the router.
In this case, expected CRT is increased for the adversary,
which concludes that the target has not to be cached by the
edge router. However, an additional delay to 1 may reduce
the content distribution for the cached contents.
On the other hand, because of the attack repetitions,
the adversary may find a delay of τ by analyzing the CRT
samples from the router. The value of τ can be changed by
proposed algorithms. For instance, instead of using a constant
τ , Schinzel [28] proposed a τ value based on cryptographic
(unpredictable) function. Through, the unpredictable delay
function of the τ , the adversary may not able to obtain the
cached targets in the router.
A similar delay countermeasure method was proposed by
work Acs et al. [4] to preserve privacy in NDN. The delay
was applied to all faces to mitigate the timing attack in NDN.
This delay can be classified by three configurations: fixed,
randomized, and unpredictable. To improve distribution effi-
ciency, the delay is configured only for the first requests.
Therefore, the first adversary’s requests miss the cache and
the attack may not succeed for the cached target as proposed
by [4] and [6].
2) RANDOMLY CACHING
To reduce the cache redundancy, the capacity of the cache
can be defined using probabilistic order as presented by [29].
On the other hand, the probabilistic cache can be used to
mitigate the side-channel timing attack. The router can be
configured for randomly caching, one named as may be
cached another may not be cached depending on the probabil-
ity configuration. The contents can be also cached by random
anonymity set (k), tomitigate the side-channel attack in NDN.
Acs et al. [4] and Chaabane [6] proposed a random caching,
that selects the contents by depending on the random number
(k) to mitigate the attacks on the edge router.
Thus, the index of the first cache hit in the output sequence
is expected to be random and ideally should not leak infor-
mation about the router’s cache. However, the adversary
may also learn the anonymity set value after various cache
miss attempts. Therefore, the random value can not be fixed,
it should rely on various k-anonymity set (e.g. probability
rate).
3) GROUP SIGNATURES
In a side-channel timing attack, the adversary uses the CRT
estimation to know where the certificate is cached. Cham
et al. [17] proposed a group signature to make public sig-
natures (e.g. public key certificate). The signature and the
certificate can be associated with a group of users, but not
to a specific member of that group. The receiver knows that
the signature is valid for any group member. For instance,
a conference video/call may use a group signature for privacy
protection because the adversary cannot knowwhich member
of the group is doing the call.
In other work Boneh et al. [18], proposed a short group
signature scheme. In this approach, themain goal is to provide
the security level of RSA signatures while reducing the length
of the signature to accelerate the verification in the group.
In both methods, the certificate can be cached only with
a group member to achieve ‘‘perfect privacy’’ for the certifi-
cate.
B. CACHE DISABLED METHODS
The cache disabled countermeasure approaches offer a ‘‘per-
fect privacy’’ by fully supported anonymity tools. However,
the disabled caching approaches can be completely against
the NDN paradigm, considering the content distribution must
have to be maintained with in-network caching on NDN.
In disabled cache approaches, the CRT is obtained as 1 + t
(Figure 7), which is considered as the maximum delay for
Alice (face0) and Adversary (face1) face.
1) TURNED-OFF CACHING
In NDN, the CS can be configured for not caching. If there is
no content held in the cache, the side-channel timing attack
VOLUME 8, 2020 145809
E. Dogruluk et al.: Public Key Certificate Privacy in VoNDN: VoNDNs
cannot be done. However, the cache is important for the NDN,
as it is required for content distribution. So, directly giving
up on the caching is not a good option in NDN, as discussed
in [4].
2) ANONYMOUS NAMED DATA NETWORKING APPLICATION
The Onion Routing (Tor) was employed layers of concentric
encryption and intermediate nodes responsible for peeling
off layers as packets travel through the overlay which is
commonly referred to as onion routing as proposed by [30].
DiBenetetto et al. [7] developed the Anonymous Named Data
Networking Application (ANDaNA) a tool to mitigate timing
attacks in NDN. ANDaNA is another practice of Tor, built
on top of NDN, that provides privacy and anonymity to the
consumers. With this tool, the requested names are encrypted
and then verified by the nodes and delivered to the user as
data. In particular, ANDaNA mitigates timing attacks from
linking the retrieved contents in CS. ANDaNA relies on mul-
tiple paired-centric layers of encryption and routes content
from the consumer via a chain of routers. First, the router
decrypts received content then it forwards the content to the
next router.
3) PrivICN
The PrivICN is a tool based on name encryption similar to
ANDaNA. The tool encrypts the name components except
for the longest prefix of the content as presented by [15].
Therefore, the cache is partially available only for the longest
prefixes. However, the adversary still can succeed in the
attack considering the longest name prefix target to locate
target locations.
4) BLOOM FILTERING
The name privacy can be maintained by bloom filters as
presented by [6]. In this approach, the consumer can com-
pute hierarchical bloom filter as HB = (B1,B2,. . . ,Bn),
where Bn is the bloom filter of name component up to n-th
component. For example, a consumer can compute a filter
B1 of /ndn, B2 of /ndn/pt, and B3 of /ndn/pt/minho for the
content of /ndn/pt/minho. Thus, a router can check the filter
Bn from the cache, if it cached it replies to the consumer.
If not, the router checks Bn in PIT. If Bn existed in PIT,
the bloom filter of the corresponding PIT is updated (add
one) and the interest dropped since a request has already been
forwarded. Otherwise, it follows the usual NDN paradigm.
With this approach, the name in the interest request is obfus-
cated resulting in transforming it into a random string of bits.
However, bloom filters can introduce false positives in name
matching.
Kondo et al. [16], also presented a similar filter-based
approach to preserve name privacy in NDN. This work dis-
tinguished the legitimate requests from others based on the
filtering. Through the bloom filters, the name of content
becomes unreadable because of the human-readable name
was transformed in a random-looking string of bits.
VI. DETECTION AND DEFENSE (DaD) PRIVACY MODEL
Effectively, the side-channel timing attack can be mitigated
by pre-configured countermeasure configurations, which
were previously discussed (available cache and disabled
methods). However, these methods may not be the most effi-
cient ones, considering their configuration is static. This may
reduce the certificate distribution efficiency for legitimate
requests as described by [6], [7], and [10]. Thus, the coun-
termeasures configurations can be considered as a trade-
off between privacy and certificate distribution efficiency.
To maintain the certificate distribution efficiency and protect
the cached certificates this work proposes an approach called
detection and defense (DaD).
The DaD is based on attack detection that can distin-
guish between legitimate and adversary faces. Through this
adversary detection, the countermeasure method can be only
applied to adversary detected face and legitimate requests
can be preserved, without being affected by the available
countermeasures. Also, the detection can be used to identify
the severity of the attack. Then, different countermeasures can
be applied to mitigate the attack. The DaD is based on three
attack detection phases where available cache methods are
applied in first and second phases and disabled cache in the
third phase.
The DaD identifies the attack in three phases as follows: i.
minor phase, where the attack is detected in the first detection
phase period window (TIME) and sets the adversary’s face
configured with the available cache countermeasure for a
time period, ii. moderate phase, where the attack persists
in the second detection phase and sets the adversary’s face
configured with a more effective available cache countermea-
sure compared to the first detection phase, and iii. severe
phase, where the attack detected in the third detection phase,
and the adversary’s face configured with the most effective
countermeasure (disabled cache) to mitigate the attack.
A. ADVERSARY FACE DETECTION
In this work, side-channel timing attack detection methods
were surveyed to detect an attack. However, the number of
related work in timing attacks on NDN is limited. For this rea-
son, this work focused on to cache pollution attack detection
method which has attack similarities with the side-channel
timing attack in NDN [11]. In the cache pollution attack,
the adversary may request the same content multiple times to
disable the cache function of the router. Also, the adversary
may create fake popularity for the contents to interfere with
the content distribution performance.
To detect an attack, the works [31] and [32] proposed that
the cache hit ratio (CHR) can be used to detect the attack
in cache pollution-related attacks. Due to the attack similari-
ties between cache pollution and side-channel timing attack,
the DaD attack detection is based on CHR calculations.
In DaD, the detection is face-based. The detection methods
can detect the possible adversary face by getting metrics
from NDN Forwarding Daemon (NFD). NFD is used as a
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network forwarder in the network layer. Therefore, the DaD
can be used to distinguish between legitimate and adversary
nodes to apply multiple countermeasures methods only to the
adversary detected face.
1) CACHE HIT RATIO (CHR)
In VoNDN, if a previously requested certificate has been
cached by a router, then a cache hit will occur in the next
incoming request for the same certificate received by that
router. In a side-channel attack, the cache hit ratio (CHR) of
the router increases when the attack succeeds [4]. Therefore,
the CHR can be used to identify the attack, as proposed by
[33]. The CHR can be used to obtain: i. the performance of
the attack, and ii. the identification of the router face under
attack.
Ideally, the cache hit ratio can be calculated periodically
by an NDN application (e.g. NFD) to identify the face of the
router that is being attacked in VoNDN. The average CHR of
all edge routers is calculated by the total cache hits of each






where n is the total number of the edge routers in the network,
and R is the total number of requests received by the edge
routers, which is equal to the total number of cache hits plus
the total number of cache misses.
The adversary may repeat the request to increase the suc-
cess of the attack. Thus, the CHR can be used to measure the
performance of the attack configuration. Previously, our work
studied CHR attack performance calculation for name pri-
vacy of the streaming-like NDN application [34]. The results
showed that the CHR increased if the adversary succeeds in
the attack for previously cached contents.
Besides the attack performance calculation, the CHR can
be used not only to detect an attack but also to identify the face
of the router that is being attacked. For instance, the CHR
can be used to identify the adversary in an attack detection
for cache pollution [32] and [31]. Also, the works [11], [12],
and [33] proposed that the side-channel timing attack can be
identified by cache hits and misses.
In DaD, the attack detection is based on CHR calculation
per face for VoNDN application. To detect the adversary’s
face, the DaD uses the CHR threshold value. If a face’s CHR
value calculated is higher than the threshold, that face of
the router is considered an adversary. Thus, the DaD dis-
tinguishes between legitimate and adversary nodes to apply
countermeasures.
2) CHR THRESHOLD CALCULATION
In DaD, the CHR threshold parameter is used to identify
the face of the router that is being attacked. This parameter
is calculated as follows. A set of m requests is collected
regularly during1T seconds. The total number of cache hits
is calculated for the new set of requests, which we consider
to be the ith collected set. So, the average CHR of this new






where CHk represents the cache hit of the k th request in the
new set. The CHk is one if the k th request gets a cache hit and
zero in case of a cache miss. Then, the new global average
CHRj is computed by the following weightedmoving average
equation:
CHRj = (α × CHRj−1)+ (1− α)× (chri) (5)
where CHRj−1 represents the last CHR value, chri is the new
value calculated by Eq. 4, and α is a weight factor between
0 and 1. TheCHRj is very sensible to the new chri value if α is
close to 1, or little sensible if α is close to 0. In DaD, α should
be chosen close to 0, because an attack increases the CHRi
when it is established, and so the system can detect it quickly.
For this reason, αwas set close to 0 in our experimental NDN-
testbed scenario. The router is considered under attack if
CHRj is higher than the threshold CHR. The CHR thresholds
were identified as follows: 5% CHR in VoNDNmulticast and
1% CHR in VoNDN (best-route) scenarios. Note that, these
thresholds can be either defined manually or dynamically
by an algorithm based, for instance, on machine learning
techniques.
B. COUNTERMEASURES IMPACT AND SEVERITY OF
ATTACK
The face of the router that is being attacked can be identified
by the detection methods to apply countermeasures. How-
ever, configuring the router with static countermeasures may
not be the most appropriate approach, considering that each
of the countermeasures configuration effects can be different
on mitigation and distribution efficiency.
In DaD, an adversary detected face can be set with differ-
ent countermeasures. When the adversary detected by CHR,
the countermeasure is only applied to the possible identified
face. The side-channel adversary detection by CHR can be
used: i. to configure a countermeasure when the adversary is
detected, and ii. to determine the severity of the attack which
can be used to set different countermeasures.
1) COUNTERMEASURE IMPACT
The DaD is based on three naïve countermeasures to apply
available cache configuration by the following:
1) unpredictable delay: The attack can be mitigated
by uniform (fixed), random distribution, and unpre-
dictable delays. However, the unpredictable delay may
be the most challenging to solve by the adversary that
is compared to other delay distributions (fixed and
random). Thus, the DaD offers an unpredictable delay
to mitigate the adversary.
The unpredictable delay is calculated by a hash func-
tion [28] and [35]. This function can be expressed by k
mod m =h(k), where k is a cryptographic integer hash
code from the key that generates unpredictable delay
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FIGURE 8. A qualitative analysis of the countermeasures impact on the
attack success.
h(k). Then, this delay is added to the adversary detected
face to challenge the adversary CRT calculations.
2) probabilistically caching: The edge router can cache
the contents by probabilistically [29]. This can be used
to mitigate the brute-force attack. The DaD offers the
contents that can be cached by p=10% probabilisti-
cally selection to the adversary detected face. This
means that the edge router is randomly selecting (based
on probabilistic function) the content from its cache
and answering (random distribution) to the adversary
detected face instead of answering directly.
Note that, in case of a detected face is directed to the
multiple addresses (devices), legitimate consumers also
are affected by the probabilistic cache. In this case,
the edge router can probabilistically cache for all faces
because it can be a challenge to distinguish between
adversary and legitimate faces.
3) no caching: This completely disables the cache and the
adversary cannot succeed any attack.
Figure 8 compares qualitatively the success of an attack
based on default and countermeasures configurations effi-
ciency to mitigate the attack. In this graph, the success of the
attack is analyzed based on the cache hit ratio (CHR). For
instance, the attack cannot have any success rate in no-cache
configuration because it completely disables the cache.
On the other hand, the additional unpredictable delay can
be considered to have a better distribution efficiency than
the probabilistic cache, because the contents can be already
cached by the router in the delay configuration. In this case,
the adversarymay determine that additional delay bymultiple
trails of attacks. However, the cache cannot be fully loaded
by a randomized distribution configuration. Therefore, in an
ideal situation of attack, the unpredictable delay configura-
tion can be considered less effective compared to a random-
ized distribution configuration.
Note that configuring the router with a high unpredictable
delay or low probabilistic rate of caching may affect severely
the content distribution efficiency.
2) DETERMINE THE SEVERITY OF THE ATTACK
In DaD, the CHR can be also used to identify the severity
of the attack. For instance, if the attack is detected in a
period (TIME) and continued in the next detection states,
the attack can be considered severe. Note that, the detection
period can be tuned by application (e.g. VoNDN) configu-
rations. For instance, the adversary was not detected in a
higher attack check time because it was already completed the
attack. On the other hand, a shorter check time may slow the
process of the router. Therefore, through several simulation
experiences, an optimum DaD period check attack time was
defined as 0.2s for VoNDN applications.
FIGURE 9. Attack states (phases) and applied countermeasures.
According to the attack severity, different countermeasures
methods can be applied tomitigate the attack andmaintain the
content distribution, as illustrated in Figure 9. For instance,
the unpredictable delay can be applied in the first detection
state (minor), the probabilistic caching in the second detec-
tion state (moderate), and no-cache in the last state (severe) to
mitigate the effect of the attack. Also, when a detected attack
is severe, the no-cache countermeasure is applied while the
attack persists. If the adversary withdraws the attack in any
detection state, the router is set to the default state (e.g. default
LRU caching).
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FIGURE 10. Detection and Defense (DaD) flowchart algorithm.
3) DETECTION AND DEFENSE (DAD) ALGORITHM
DaD can be designed for any NDN application to maintain
certificate privacy and content distribution. In fact, instead of
setting the router with a static countermeasure method, DaD
applies dynamically three countermeasures when the router
is under attack.
In this work, the DaD algorithm was designed for both
name and certificate privacy in a trusted VoNDN and stream-
ing NDNtube applications. Ideally, the algorithm can be
implemented in the application layer to protect cached
streamed content and certificates. This design is based on
the CHR threshold to detect the adversary face during the
attack. DaD checks the existence of an attack and applies the
countermeasures every TIME seconds.
If the CHR is above the CHR threshold, the DaD identifies
it as an adversary’s face and defines the severity of attack as
minor, moderate, or severe. To protect the certificate privacy
in VoNDN, DaD was designed based on the following three
countermeasures: unpredictable delay, probabilistic cache,
and no-cache.
The DaD algorithm is presented in Figure 10. The algo-
rithm uses two attack states (attack detected, no-attack
detected), determined by the attack detection method, which
is in this case is based on CHRmetrics. i. no attack detected.
The default cache replacement policy is applied to all faces,
which may be, for instance, LRU. ii. attack detected. The
attack is detected by the detection threshold in the router. The
DaD uses, the cache hit ratio to detect the attack. However,
other detections mechanisms, such as CRT and name-prefix
analyzes can be adapted to the algorithm.
Depending on the severity of the attack, three counter-
measures can be applied by DaD to the detected adversary
face. Let us consider the application runs at the default phase
(no attack detected) and the DaD checks the existence of
the attack every TIME seconds. Let us consider that TIME
is equal to two seconds for the VoNDN application. If the
attack is detected after the check time, the router switches
from the default phase to the attack detected phase. In this
case, the DaD identifies the attack as minor for 2 seconds
and applies a delay phase to the adversary’s face. If the attack
continues in the next attack check, then DaD considers the
attack as moderate and sets the router for the random phase
for another 2 seconds to the adversary’s face. In the next
attack check, if the attack persists, DaD sets the adversary’s
face of the attacked router for no-cache and keeps always in
this state while the attack exists in the next attack checks.
If the attack is withdrawn in any phase, then the router returns
to the default phase and the whole process restarts again.
TABLE 1. DaD algorithm description and parameters.
Table 1 shows the main parameters and the attack phases
used by the DaD algorithm. The TIME and the cacheHit-
Treshold are pre-defined parameters used by this algorithm.
TIME is the period used to detect the existence of an attack
per face. So, it is the check attack time, which means that
every TIME seconds the router is checked for an attack for
each face. The router is considered under attack when the
cache hit ratio (CHR) is higher than the cacheHitTreshold
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for a certain face. The auxiliary getCacheHitRatio() pro-
cess is used to obtain the CHR from each face of the
router where DaD is running. If the attack is detected
(ATTACK_DETECTED), then distinct countermeasures are
applied according to the severity of the attack during the pre-
defined time (TIME).
So, to recapitulate the DaD procedure for contents
(streamed or certificate), when an attack is firstly detected,
the router enters in the delay phase (delayPhase) and keeps
in this phase until the next attack check, which will occur
TIME seconds later. During the delay phase, all contents
are sent through the detected face with an additional unpre-
dictable delay set by the apply_Delay() process. If the attack
persists in the second attack check, then the attack detected
face enters in the random phase (randomPhase). During this
phase, the cached contents are selected from the router’s
cache with the apply_Random() process to be distributed to
the adversary detected face. This random distribution is based
on a probabilistic function.
If the attack persists in the third detection period check,
then the attack detected face enters the no-cache phase
(noCachePhase) and stays in this phase while the attack
persists. During this phase, no contents are stored in the cache
of the detected face. If the attack is withdrawn in any phase
of the ATTACK_DETECTED condition, the router switches
to the default phase (defaultPhase).
If the CHR is not above the cacheHitTreshold,
then no attack is detected (NO_ATTACK_DETECTED),
which establishes the default phase by setting the
apply_defaultPolicy() process. In this phase, DaD applies the
default caching policy to the router.
The DaD uses the CHR detection metric in privacy-
sensitive applications (e.g. trusted VoNDN) to identify the
adversary node. However, this metric depends on the type
of application. Since it is not possible to define a priori
a threshold for all applications, this may require that the
attack check period (TIME) be adjusted automatically by the
application. In this way, the DaD algorithm could be adapted
to a voice-over NDN application, as discussed next.
C. DaD CONFIGURATION ON VoNDN
The adversary may identify the consumers’ private infor-
mation, such as approximated locations through a targeted
certificate in VoNDN. In trusted VoNDN application, the cer-
tificates provide integrity for callee and caller. The certificate
can be issued by CA or self-signed. However, the cached
certificate may provide such pieces of information when it is
targeted by the adversary, namely: i. the name of callee/caller,
ii. the location of callee/caller, and iii. the approximate time
of the conversation.
In VoNDN, the adversary’s face is detected if it overcomes
the thresholds in 0.2 seconds. Then, multiple countermea-
sures can be applied by depending on the severity of the
attack: i. unpredictable delay, ii. probabilistic cache, and
iii. no-cache. In this design, the CHR threshold value can be
used to obtain the adversary’s face and to identify the severity
of the attack. Also, the DaD allows updating the threshold
value in each pre-defined time to make decisions about the
adversary and countermeasure.
In VoNDN, DaD considers adversary face if a face’s CHR
up to 1% in best-route and 5% in multicast forwarding strate-
gies. In this application, DaD is analyzing ≈20 packets in
every 0.2 seconds for all faces. As presented previously, DaD
sets the minor, moderate, and severe phases depending on
CHR thresholds these calculated in every 0.2 seconds.
VII. SCENARIO IMPLEMENTATION
In this work, the scenario was implemented and simulated on
ndnSIM version 2.6. The simulation scenarios were scripted
based on the following: i. implement the trusted VoNDN
application that simulated in NDN-testbed topology, ii. brute-
force side-channel timing attack implementation to increase
attack success for multiple targets (certificate), and iii. DaD
privacy model implementation to mitigate the brute-force
attack and comparison of the attack mitigation performance
with the statically configured countermeasure probabilistic
caching.
A. BRUTE-FORCE ATTACK DEVELOPMENT
In traditional side-channel timing attack design, an adversary
defines the targets for objects of particular content (seg-
ments). However, this type of attack uses to be inefficient
in terms of success, when it is directed simultaneously to
multiple named certificate.
In this work, an attack design called brute-force was
adapted to the side-channel timing attack. Using a brute-force
attack, the adversary can target multiple contents and attack
them in a short period. This attack can be also considered as
a burst attack that is using repeated in short bursts of targets
at random intervals [36].
In the brute-force attack, the adversary tries all possible
combinations of password dictionaries until getting one that
matches [37], [38]. To mitigate this attack, web providers
limit the requests for a short period (e.g. several failed pass-
words attempts) and enhancing the complexity of the pass-
word dictionary (e.g. requiring special characters).
In this work, the brute-force was configured for the content
names measuring the response times from the edge router.
In this attack, an adversary defines the targets by content
segments trying to retrieve them in a short time. The target
can be a content segment or a public-key certificate which
can be defined by the requirement of the attack. Additionally,
this brute-force attack was designed to retrieve streamed
content or certificate by randomly and at the same time to
increase the attack success.
Attack Procedure: Figure 11 illustrates the brute-force
attack process to success the attack for the multiple targets
(Tn). These can be the predefined name of content or certifi-
cate to start the attack procedure for data packets. If the target
(e.g. streamed content or certificate) has not been produced by
its producer, the NACK packet occurs with ‘‘content wasn’t
available’’ message.
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FIGURE 11. Brute-force side-channel timing attack flowchart.
The adversary may repeat the attack several times to distin-
guish the targets between cached and un-cached. In each rep-
etition, the adversary retrieves different or same CRT values
in order to conclude the target is cached by edge or neigh-
bor/away routers. As shown in Figure 11, the adversary
selects a target (Tx) randomly from all targets (Tn). To suc-
ceed in the attack, the adversary must repeat each of the tar-
gets at least two times. In this algorithm, the attack repetition
is defined as n−1, which can be varied by side-channel attack
design. Then a set of CRT values (CRTi) is obtained for the
repetition of a target (Tx).
When the attack finished, the adversary nodes can identify
the target location by comparing their CRT. For instance,
if the difference between the first CRT and all the others
is small (less than ε), the CRTi presents the target (Tx) has
been recently cached by the by edge router otherwise it is
cached by away routers. Also, the adversary can identify
target’ geographic distances in terms of hops by analyzing
away routers CRTi as also studied by [13].
Therefore, the attack can be configurable for multiple tar-
gets to succeed adversary may able to configure the multiple
targets by the brute-force attack. Additionally, the adversary
is also able to identify the approximate locations for the
missed content(s) by comparing their CRTs.
B. SCENARIO CONFIGURATIONS
In the VoNDN scenario, each content (e.g. voice/video,
media, and certificate) is signed by its callee and caller
to authenticate the conversation. To verify the callee and
caller public keys, the certificate authority (CA) publishes
a certificate that binds the name and the public-key with
a CA signature. The certificates are cached by the NDN-
testbed routers to establish the call session in the next time.
The trusted VoNDN application scenario was implemented to
analyze brute-force attack findings.
1) NDN-TESTBED TOPOLOGY
The VoNDN was simulated on a real NDN-testbed topology.
The NDN-testbed is consists of 42 NDN routers on the global
participating institutions [8].
Figure 12 illustrates the current global NDN-testbed topol-
ogy with its gateway routers. This topology was implemented
in the NDN simulator (ndnSIM).
TABLE 2. NDN-testbed bandwidth and delays of the links.
Table 2 shows the minimum and maximum delays of the
links and bandwidths of the NDN-testbed. In testbed, the link
delay may vary between the nodes. This caused by a link
design between nodes. For instance, minho node is only
linked with basel, coruna, copelabs, urjc, and padua. Also,
the callee and caller are leaf nodes of the NDN-testbed.
2) VoNDN CONFIGURATION
In the VoNDN application, the callee and caller are paired
and send their packets at a constant rate (100 packets/s)
to each other. Also, the callee and caller are configured to
request a data packet (≈168 kB), that can be presented as
voice/video, media, and certificate. These can be requested by
an interest packet (≈50 kB). Note that, the voice conversation
does not have any silence period because of the callee and
callers are configured with a default constant bit rate (CBR).
Also, because of VoNDN is implemented only for the attack
purposes, encoding/decoding voice and video format (e.g.
H.264) was not implemented.
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FIGURE 12. NDN-testbed topology (adapted from [8]).
In the VoNDN scenario, each named data packets are
signed by a public key to provide the integrity of the callee
and caller. This can be trusted by a certificate authority or a
self-signed certificate.
Figure 13 illustrates the two-way communication VoNDN
application in perspective on how the design of applications
and adversaries can be done. In this scenario, the callee
and caller publish their interest and data packets to each
other without relying on any middle transmission server
such as a SIP proxy or a SIP server. To establish a
call, the callee and caller exchange data using each-other
their unique-call-id (/vondn/user/unique-call-id). To authen-
ticate the conversation, the CA publishes certificates (e.g.
/ndn/domain/vondn/KEY) and these can be cached by gate-
way routers. Also, the callee or the caller can authenticate
themselves by digital signing data packets, using public-key
cryptography. For that public-key certificates are required,
issued by CA authority.
In a trusted-VoNDN application demonstration (Fig-
ure 13), the adversary nodes (adversary-1 and adversary-
2) pursues the targets that are recently cached by
gateway routers to knowledge Callee (e.g. Bob) and
Caller (e.g. Alice) locations. Each of targeted certifi-
cate (/ndn/domain/vondn/KEY/[cert-name+digest]), was
requested and delivered to the caller or callee. Caller (caller-
1) public-key certificate is used by the Callee (callee-1),
while callee-1 public-key certificate is used by the caller-1,
to validate the signature and authenticate each-other packets.
In this attack, the adversary probes multiple certificates
(targets) by brute-force and randomly in order to maximize
the success of the attack. Additionally, the attack is repeated
at least four times to differentiate the target that has been
cached by the edge router or the other routers (neighbor and
away). Finally, the adversary can analyze these four CRT
samples to conclude that the target has been cached or not
by the edge router. Also, other adversaries are (adversary-
. . .) attacking to other caller and callee (callee-. . . and caller-
. . .) to conclude that their certificates are cached by edge,
neighbor, and away routers. For instance, the adversary-
1 identifies the following locations: i. If the Callee-1 cer-
tificate is retrieved from router-1 the target is located at an
edge router, ii. If the Callee-1 certificate is retrieved from
router-2 the target is located at a neighbor router, and iii If
the Callee-1 certificate is retrieved from router-3 the target is
located at away router(s). These decisions are also taken by
adversary-2 for router-4, 5, and 6.
On the other hand, the voice/video, media, and certificate
packets can be transmitted with different routing strategies to
recover the packet loss (e.g. due to traffic congestion). The
attack scenario was implemented using two routing strate-
gies: i. the best route, where packets are routed through the
best path between the nodes and ii. multicast, where packets
are routed to group nodes forwarding strategies. These were
implemented with the least recently used (LRU), this cache
replacement policy discards the least recently used certificate
first from the content store.
3) VoNDN ATTACK SCENARIO CONFIGURATION
Table 3 shows the adversary configuration for the attack
scenario. In this model, the selected adversary nodes (≈35%)
targeted the certificates (e.g. /ndn/domain/vondn/KEY/[cert-
name+digest]) that were previously cached by routers
and produced by certificate authority (e.g.
/ndn/domain/vondn/KEY). Each named certificate has
an unique sha-256 cryptographic digest function (e.g.
. . ./sha256digest=fde78cbdff. . .c4106) to authenticate the
callee and the caller’s identity.
The extracted NDN-testbed topology consists of 42 global
routers (edge, neighbor, and aways). To establish a VoNDN
conversation, an additional 10 consumers (callee and caller)
are added to each global router. Therefore, the VoNDN attack
scenario is used 462 (420+42) nodes in total and 210 paired
VoNDN conversation occurred.
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FIGURE 13. VoNDN attack design.
TABLE 3. VoNDN attack scenario configuration.
In VoNDN, the NDN-testbed nodes that are used to trans-
mit voice/video and certificate packets to the VoNDN con-
sumers via 42 gateway routers. In this scenario, 10 leaf nodes
(callee and caller) were assigned to each edge router to rep-
resent the callee and the caller. The adversaries attack these
42 edge routers to obtain ≈65% legitimate cached certificate
locations.
In the simulation, the adversaries, the callee(s), and the
callers were randomly selected for each simulation run. The
results were collected from an average of 10 simulation runs
for each LRU forwarding strategy (best-route and multicast).
The targeted certificates were retrieved by brute-force and
each target request was repeated 4 times to increase the attack
success. When the attack finished, the adversaries compare
the CRTs of certificates that were collected from the routers
to decide where/when the certificates have been cached.
As shown in Table 3, the NDN-testbed routers were classified
by the following terms: i. edge routers represent the first-hop
routers of the leaf nodes, ii. neighbor routers are the second
hop routers of the leaf nodes, and iii. away routers are those
located at more than two hops away from the leaf nodes.
A certificate authority may be located in an away router.
In these experiments, the CHR, CRT, and hop count met-
rics were used to analyze the attack behaviors to distinguish
between legitimate and adversarial requests. These results are
presented next.
VIII. RESULTS
To analyze the simulated scenario results, the metrics CRT,
CHR, and hop counts were analyzed for best-route and mul-
ticast forwarding strategies. The results were analyzed based
on the following: i. to evaluate the brute-force attack per-
formance for multiple targets in trusted VoNDN application
using the CHR results, ii. to analyze the attack based on
the location information about the callee and the caller, iii.
to compare DaD performance with a static countermeasure
(probabilistic caching) to mitigate the brute-force timing
attack, and iv. to analyze the performance of the content
distribution between a statically configured countermeasure
(probabilistically caching) and DaD by analyzing the CRT
and hop count metrics.
In this setup, the probabilistically caching was imple-
mented that stands as a static router configuration to be com-
pared with DaD. This comparison attempts to show that how
DaD can be an efficient approach to mitigate the attack and
maintaining the legitimate certificate requests in the VoNDN
testing scenario.
A. ATTACK PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
With multicast forwarding strategy, multiple paths are fol-
lowed by data packets, and contents are cached in more
routers, while in best-route only the best path’s routers cache
the content. In these experiments, the adversaries can dis-
tinguish between cached and un-cached targets through the
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retrieved CRT values and take an attack decision about the
callee and the caller locations.
FIGURE 14. VoNDN brute-force attack performance on forwarding
strategies.
Figure 14 illustrates the results of the CHR values to
measure the performance of the attack for best-route and
multicast forwarding strategies with LRU configuration on
NDN-testbed topology. In this scenario, the certificates were
previously cached by edge routers which were used to estab-
lish a voice/video conversation (≈0-5 sec.). Thus, the average
of CHR was calculated globally based on all edge routers,
as defined by previous Eq. 3. The attack period occurs in the
interval of ≈21-40 seconds.
The adversaries targeted the certificates to know the
location of callee and caller (≈65% of legitimate nodes).
To improve the success of the attack, the brute-force pro-
cedure can be repeated by an adversary. By accomplishing
this, an adversary can distinguish between first and last rep-
etitions. In this attack scenario, the adversary nodes retrieve
the targets with 4 repetitions (Table 3). Thirty-five percent of
adversary nodes were able to target 252 certificates to identify
the locations of legitimate nodes. The attack performance
measured in terms of global CHR, given by Eq. 3, presented
the following values for the edge routers: ≈1% for nfd:best-
route and ≈50.5% for nfd:multicast.
B. CERTIFICATE LOCATION DETERMINATION
The public key certificates are cached by the NDN-testbed
routers. Since the adversary targets the consumers’ certifi-
cates, these can identify the location of the consumer.
If the target (certificate) has been cached in the edge router,
then the adversary hits the cache and obtains the minimum
CRT. Through this attack, an adversary can identify the tar-
gets that have been cached by the edge router. Moreover,
the adversary can determine the un-cached target locations
by analyzing the CRT values. For instance, the maximum
CRT reveals that the certificate has not been cached by any
router, except by its producer (CA). If the CRT obtained is
between minimum and maximum, an adversary concludes
that the target has been cached by neighbor routers.
In this experiment, the adversaries were configured to dis-
tinguish the location of the cached and un-cached certificate
by comparing each of the collected CRTs. The CRT values
are used to classify the targets, based on three locations: i.
cached by edge routers, ii. cached by neighbor routers, and
iii. cached by away routers.
FIGURE 15. Determine certificate locations in VoNDN.
Figure 15 shows the results of the target locations based
on the CRTs obtained in the VoNDN multicast default sce-
nario without countermeasures. In this experiment, the adver-
saries were configured to target all certificates these are
cached by various locations. The computed location findings
are based on all adversary’s CRT calculations. The adver-
saries concluded that the targets were located on the routers
as follows: i. 70.8% cached by the edge router, ii. 17.4%
cached by the neighbor router, and iii. 11.8% cached by the
away routers or certificate authority. In this attack scenario,
the adversaries are configured to attack all possible targets
at the same time. Because of this, the success of the attack
is computed highest of the edge router. Also, the forwarding
strategy increased to the success of the attack because every
node cached the certificates with multicast.
C. COUNTERMEASURES
To mitigate the attack, the countermeasures based on static
probabilistic and DaD were configured with the NDN for-
warding daemon (NFD), which used as a network forwarder.
The countermeasures were implemented in VoNDN with
the best-route and the multicast forwarding strategies on the
default LRU scenario.
The following configurations were used to mitigate the
brute-force attack:
1) The edge routers were statically configured with a
probabilistic caching of 10% of content cache accep-
tance by randomly chosen of the data packet that can
be cached. The global CHR results (adversary’s faces)
of these edge routers were analyzed and compared with
the LRU, which is used replacement policy in ndnSIM.
2) The edge routers were configured within a DaD algo-
rithm, which identifies the face of the router that is
being attacked by checking the CHR threshold every
0.2 seconds and applying each countermeasures phase
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during 2 seconds. When an attacked face is detected,
the DaD applies countermeasure strategies, depending
on the severity of the attack. To detect the face that is
being attacked and apply countermeasures, the CHR
threshold values were used. In this work, the threshold
values were identified only for this particular attack
scenario which may be different on other NDN appli-
cations. Through the VoNDN simulation experiences,
a predefined CHR threshold was identified by moving
average values as 1% CHR for best-route and 5% CHR
for multicast forwarding strategies. If the attack was
withdrawn by an adversary or does not exist, the DaD
applies the default (LRU) phase.
In VoNDN, the implemented DaD checks the existence of
an attack on the faces every 0.2 seconds and the countermea-
sure phases (each for 2 sec.) are only applied to the attacked
edge routers, in order to protect the legitimate certificate
requests from the edge router(s). The DaD detects the attack
by checking the CHR (Eq.5 with a α=0) threshold on every
face.
FIGURE 16. Comparisons of applied countermeasures in VoNDN
best-route forwarding strategy.
1) APPLIED COUNTERMEASURES ON THE VoNDN
Figure 16 illustrates the VoNDN CHR results obtained with
a brute-force attack, considering the use of the probabilistic
caching (10%) and the DaD in the routers. In both cases,
the best-route forwarding strategywas used. An average CHR
of 0.69% was obtained in the attack period with the prob-
abilistic caching, which mitigated the attack ≈30.3% when
compared with the results of the default LRU scenario (Fig-
ure 14). On the other hand, theDaDdetects the attacked router
first then applies different countermeasures phases while the
attack persists with a 1% CHR threshold. If no attack is
detected, then DaD sets the router face to the default phase.
The average CHR obtained was 0.42%, which represents
attack mitigation of ≈57.5%, when compared to the default
LRU best-route scenario. The DaD also performed 39.1%
improved the attack mitigation compared to the probabilistic
caching configuration.
FIGURE 17. Comparisons of applied countermeasures in VoNDN multicast
forwarding strategy.
Figure 17 shows the CHR results obtained in a multicast
forwarding strategy in VoNDN. The discontinuities seen at
21s, 24.5 s, and 27.5 s in the DaD graphics of Figure 17
(and Figure 16) are due to the application of the counter-
measures. Using the probabilistic caching (10%) for all faces,
an average CHR of 8.12% was obtained during the attack
period. This configuration mitigated the attack about 83.9%
when compared with the default LRU scenario in multicast
(Figure 14). The CHR threshold in DaD was configured to
5% for a multicast attack scenario. In this case, an average
of CHR 5.15% was obtained, which mitigated the attack
89.8%, when compared to the default LRUmulticast scenario
(Figure 14), and mitigated the attack 36.5%, when compared
with the probabilistic caching.
2) COUNTERMEASURES DISTRIBUTION EFFICIENCY
EVALUATION
The DaD only applies the countermeasures to the attack
detected faces instead of setting countermeasures to all faces.
Thus, legitimate requests and privacy can be preserved by the
DaD. To show this, the CRT (best-route) and hop counts (mul-
ticast) were analyzed on default (LRU) and countermeasures
(Probabilistic and DaD) VoNDN scenarios.
3) CRT RESULTS
Figure 18 illustrates the global CRT results (best-route) for
both adversary and legitimate nodes considering on default
LRU (best-route), probabilistic caching, and DaD scenarios
during the attack time (21-40 s). If the target is cached by
the edge router, the minimum CRT values are obtained for
adversary nodes otherwise it obtains increased CRT values
for neighbor and away targets. To show the countermeasures
(probabilistic and DaD) results to mitigate the attack on the
default (LRU) scenario, the CRT values were analyzed.When
the probabilistic and the DaD were applied, the adversary
node’s CRT value increases for the targets which are illustrat-
ing the attack mitigation rate. In this case, the adversary may
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not able to identify the location of the cached target because
of unsteady collected CRTs.
The countermeasures (probabilistic and DaD) can be used
to mitigate the attack. However, the CRT results showing that
the static probabilistic caching also increases the legitimate
node CRTs, which reduces the content distribution perfor-
mance for the legitimate nodes. To preserve the legitimate
nodes’ requests, the DaD applies the countermeasures only
to the face that being attacked. Thus, an average of CRT is
calculated as the same (0.056 ms) for nfd:DaD and nfd:LRU
(best-route).
FIGURE 18. VoNDN Global CRT results for the adversary and legitimate
nodes.
Table 4 shows, the CRT metrics these illustrated in Fig-
ure 18 in VoNDN. During the attack period, the legitimate
CRT metrics were preserved by the DaD, compared to the
probabilistic caching. Also, the CRT values of the adversaries
are higher than those of the legitimate nodes because the
adversaries were also targeted to un-cached certificates in
order to obtain neighbor and away routers. Because DaD
TABLE 4. VoNDN CRT average values for legitimate and adversary nodes.
only applies the countermeasures to the adversary’s faces,
the average CRT of DaD calculated 0.419 ms which is higher
than CRT of probabilistic (0.328 ms). Thus, DaD mitigated
more attack than static probabilistic countermeasure while
protecting legitimate requests.
FIGURE 19. VoNDN adversary and legitimate nodes hop count metrics.
4) HOP COUNT RESULTS
Figure 19 shows the global hop-count results on default
LRU (multicast), probabilistic, and DaD scenarios during
the attack time (21-40 s). If the attack became succeed
the minimum hop count metric can be obtained because
of adversary hits the edge routers. If an attack is not suc-
cessful, the maximum hop count metrics obtained. Because
of no-countermeasure applied in LRU (multicast) scenario,
the adversary’s average of hop-count metrics is obtained
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minimum (≈1.04) than the average of legitimate node’s hop
counts (≈2.38) during the attack.
To mitigate the attack on the default (LRU) scenario,
the countermeasures (probabilistic and DaD) were set. When
countermeasures are applied, the hop count of adversaries
increases. However, the hop counts of legitimate nodes also
increase in probabilistic caching configuration, because of
its set to all faces. On the other hand, the DaD only set the
countermeasures to attack the detected face, which preserved
the hop counts of legitimate requests.
TABLE 5. VoNDN hop count countermeasure results.
Table 5 shows the average hop count metrics for the
applied countermeasures (probabilistic and DaD) to mitigate
the attacks on the default multicast (LRU) VoNDN scenario.
During the attack period (21-40 s), the default scenario pre-
sented an average hop count of 2.38 for legitimate nodes and
1.04 for the adversary nodes.
The probabilistic and DaD scenarios are applied in order to
mitigate the attack on the default scenario. In the probabilistic
scenario, the average of adversaries hop count increased to
1.84 from 1.04 (default). This reveals the attack mitigation
of about 55% on the default scenario. However, the prob-
abilistic caching also increased the average hop counts of
the legitimate certificate requests from 2.38 (default) to 2.43.
Therefore, 2%of theVoNDNconversation traffic between the
callee and the caller may be considered as affected or delayed
because of the probabilistic scenario.
In DaD, the legitimate requests preserved and the aver-
age hop count was equal to the value obtained in the LRU
(default) scenario (2.38). These values suggest that DaD
may have applied the countermeasures only to the attack
detected faces. In DaD, the average hop count was increased
to 35.9 from 1.04 for the adversary nodes. These results
are showing that the performance of attack is significantly
decreased under DaD’s multiple countermeasure configura-
tion.
IX. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this work, a brute-force side-channel timing attack and
a countermeasure approach called DaD were presented for
in-network caching based trusted VoNDN application. The
attack scenario was simulated on NDN-testbed topology. The
adversaries targeted 252 certificates cached in the NDN-
testbed routers to gather information for the callee and caller
locations.
To increase the success of the attack, a brute-force attack
was designed based on a random selection of multiple targets.
The adversaries succeeded to determine the location of the
targets by the following values: 70.8% cached by the edge
routers, 17.4% cached by the neighbor routers, and 11.8%
cached by away routers. Also, the performance of brute-
force attack implementation in terms of the CHR on the edge
routers was the following: 1% CHR in best-route, and 50.5%
CHR in multicast forwarding strategies with default (LRU)
scenario. Tomitigate the brute-force attack on the default sce-
nario, the probabilistic caching and DaD were implemented.
In terms of CHR, the results showed that the attack mitigation
improvedwith the DaDwhen comparedwith the probabilistic
caching, by the following values: 39.1% in best-route and
36.5% in the multicast forwarding strategies.
In terms of average CRT, the results show that the attack
mitigation with DaD improved 51% when compared with the
probabilistic caching. Moreover, DaD obtained an average
CRT of the legitimate nodes equal to the value obtained
with the default (LRU), which suggests that the legitimate
requests were preserved. Unlike the probabilistic caching,
the average hop count results show that the DaD only applies
the countermeasures to the attack detected faces, which helps
to preserve the legitimate node requests. Also in terms of hop
counts, the use of probabilistic caching revealed that 2% of
the legitimate requests were not preserved when compared
with the DaD.
FUTURE WORK
In this work, the CHR thresholds and the detection period
were identified manually. In the future, the threshold and the
detection period will be adjusted dynamically using machine
learning techniques.
SOURCE CODE
Scenarios were scripted by the C++11 library in ndnSIM
2.6. The scenario implementations and required tools can
be publicly accessible at the author’s GitHub account—
https://git.io/JJqEw
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